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ABSTRACT 
We discuss an important breakthrough for us in our search for a technical meaning of 
‘understanding’ in mathematics education. In this paper we describe the background to 
this discovery, the catalyst for the breakthrough and a concise explanation of our new 
definition. In discussing the consequences of this definition, both in terms of the 
theoretical implications for the internal characteristics and external manifestations of 
understanding with some initial practical consequences for a teacher’s attempts to 
model a learner’s understanding, we begin to describe our ongoing search for a more 
comprehensive theory. 
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Much of our work during the past five years has been devoted to developing a theory 
of learning which accounts for our own experiences as learners, teachers and 
researchers. The theory we have developed – in which we identify learning 
experiences as natural, conflicting or alien, and consider the ways in which learners 
might respond to them (Duffin and Simpson, 1993) – has been used to analyse a 
number of the learning incidents we have encountered (Duffin and Simpson, 1995). In 
the course of such analyses we found that the word ‘understanding’ often entered our 
discussions and eventually we felt compelled to seek a definition of the word which 
would fit within the basic framework of our theory and might enable us to make more 
sense of the incidents we encountered. The quest for such a definition has occupied us 
for more than three years and we will use this paper to explore how we came to our 
current position. 
The paper is not focussed on understanding, its focus is on the journey we undertook 
to make sense of a particular term (which happens to be 'understanding) in the context 
of our on-going development of a personal theory of learning. As such, the paper 
contains almost as much about what we later came to see as mistaken (or to replace) 
as it does about the terminus of our journey: our current definition of understanding. 
SETTING OUT ON OUR JOURNEY 
Our search had three main phases, during each of which something has emerged that 
has been of significance to our thinking about the meaning of ‘understanding’. 
Though subject to later modification as the work has progressed, each stage can be 
seen to have an influence on our present position. 
Unusually for us, we began our work from a purely theoretical perspective. From the 
realisation that we were using a term like ‘understanding’ in an essentially undefined 
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way to explain our interpretations of learners’ responses, we sensed a need to provide 
a technical meaning for the word within the broader theory we had developed up to 
that point. So, rather than beginning from critical incidents – our usual practice – with 
the aim of providing a theoretical framework which might explain them, we began 
from our existing framework with a question: ‘what, within our theory, might 
understanding consist of?’ 
Our theory postulates that learners encounter three kinds of experience, which we 
have come to call natural, conflicting and alien, to which they respond by modifying 
their internal mental structures in different ways. We define a natural experience as 
one that fits the learner’s current mental structures and as one to which they respond 
by strengthening the structure. A conflict is an experience which jars with the existing 
structures, either by showing that the way of working associated with the structure 
cannot cope in the way expected or by showing that more than one – previously 
dissociated –  mental structure can be brought to bear on the same situation. We 
conjecture that learners respond to such conflicts by weakening or destroying the 
structure, by limiting the domain of experiences with which the structure is expected 
to cope or by constructing links between previously separate structures. In contrast, an 
alien experience is one that has no fit with the existing mental structures at all: it 
neither fits nor causes conflict. In response, a learner may ignore or avoid the 
experience or may absorb it as a new, separate structure that then becomes liable to 
modification through later natural, conflicting and alien experiences. 
It was in the context of this theory, then, that we asked our question about a technical 
meaning for ‘understanding’: technical in the sense that our aim is not to replace the 
general use of the word, but to ground our personal meaning of it within our 
developing theory. Our first answer to this question came almost as soon as we asked 
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it and we developed our first definition of understanding, which was to stay with us 
for some considerable time before we felt the need to modify it. We defined 
understanding as: 
the awareness of connections between internal mental structures. 
At this point, we began to focus on how such understanding may manifest itself and 
whether this new-found definition might provide an explanation for those 
manifestations. We initially examined our feelings, using our own internal perceptions 
to answer the question ‘what do I feel when I understand?’ and compared those 
perceptions with those of colleagues with whom we talked. We found considerable 
agreement about the affective aspects of understanding, including: 
When I understand 
• I feel comfortable 
• I feel confident 
• I feel able to forget the detail, confident that I can reconstruct it 
whenever I need it 
• I feel that the thing belongs to me 
• I can explain it to others 
At the same time, we compared these feelings and our definition with our initial 
examination of the literature on understanding. From this we discerned two seemingly 
discrete approaches amongst researchers in the field, though – as we shall see later – 
our perceptions of what these researchers were saying have been modified in the light 
of our progress along this journey and, with some, we have moved from a sense of 
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profound disagreement to a realisation that we can absorb what they are saying within 
our new framework. 
At the time, however, it appeared to us that the two approaches split those who 
believed understanding to be associated with an ability to do, or with a set of skills, 
from others who demanded that understanding has cognitive qualities besides the 
ability to perform tasks. We found ourselves surprised that the former group 
contained Gagné (1970) who, while he mentioned a relation to the ‘internal state of 
the individual’, wrote about understanding as “the attainment of an organised set of 
intellectual skills”. In many senses (and in line with our theory) we found ourselves 
rejecting or ignoring those whose perceptions seemed alien to our own and were 
happier in aligning ourselves with those who expected more, like Van Engen (1953), 
who described understanding as “a process of organising and integrating knowledge 
according to a set of criteria” (an idea that resonates with more recent work, such a 
Hiebert and Carpenter, 1992), and others detailed in the review article of Byers 
(1980).  
Some authors’ views seemed to have a very close match with our own, particularly in 
emphasising the role of internal connections in the definition of ‘understanding’ and 
in describing manifestations of understanding which fit with our own. Thus Skemp 
(1976) makes the role of connections clear in his description of partial understanding 
which “would occur when the student forms some connections, but not enough to 
make use of the new knowledge in an assortment of different situations” and Poincaré 
(1908) talks of understanding as synthesis, which he linked with creativity and 
describes his feelings of his understanding of a proof as “if I have the feeling, the 
intuition … so as to perceive at a glance the reasoning as a whole, I need no longer 
fear lest I forget one of the elements.”  
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The level of consonance with these other authors led us to feel some confidence in the 
relevance of our work so far, but at this point we found ourselves diverted from our 
quest until the second phase overtook us when two incidents occurred in quick 
succession, drawing us back to the practical roots of our work.  
THE TWO INCIDENTS 
The first incident concerned a student on a numeracy course who had been asked to do 
a subtraction (532 – 286) in the way she had been taught at school.  Our attention was 
drawn to a snippet of conversation between her and another student who asked ‘Why 
did you put a two there?’ to which the reply was ‘because one would not have been 
enough’.  It transpired she was attempting to use the method of equal additions, adding 
a 1 to the unit 2 (making it 12) and another to the 8 which she read as 18.  When she 
continued the procedure by adding a 1 to the 3 her common sense told her that this was 
insufficient and that she needed 23 at the top to enable the 18 to be subtracted from it; 
hence the initial comment which characterised the incident.  Consternation arose for her 
when she then went to the hundreds column, where she added a 2 to the 2 to make 22, 
because at this stage she recognised that there was an insuperable problem because 
there was no way to proceed that would solve the problem she now had.  She failed to 
complete the subtraction, saying that she wished she had been allowed to do the 
subtraction in her head. 
The second incident concerned a colleague who was listening to us discussing the 
problems of the student in the first incident. He suddenly announced that he had been 
trying to remember the trigonometrical formulae for multiple angles, but had been 
unable to recall them. He was, however, very proud of himself when he was able to 
reconstruct them all just by recalling the formula 1sincos 22 =+ .  
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MOVING OFF AGAIN 
Our attention was re-engaged by these incidents which we then tried to analyse in the 
light of our definition.  In the incidents, one learner tried and failed to carry out a task 
while the other, who confessed to having forgotten what he wanted to recall, was able 
to recreate the processes successfully by calling on connections he had available. 
It was this recognition that, while both were about learners who had forgotten 
something, only one was successful in recapturing what had been forgotten, which was 
the catalyst for further investigation.  It was clear to us that the success came from 
awareness of appropriate connections on the part of the second learner, precisely in 
accordance with our definition.  The failure appeared to come because the other learner 
was merely trying to recall the steps of a procedure without using any significant 
connections that we might interpret as an understanding of the procedure. 
The incident led the words reconstructing and reproducing to become central to 
refocusing on our search. At the time they depicted for us the actions of those who do or 
do not understand.  It seemed that the learner who did not understand could only 
attempt (and fail) to reproduce a forgotten procedure, while the one who did understand  
was able, despite lack of recall, to reconstruct what was wanted by using his awareness 
of the appropriate connections. Moreover, the second incident further confirmed one of 
the characteristics we had identified: that if you understand something, you do not need 
to remember all the details. It also drew our attention back to the link Poincaré made 
between understanding and creativity, as our own investigation into creativity (Duffin 
and Simpson, 1991) had made links for us between that and reconstructing. 
All these thoughts set us off again on our search, this time beginning to wonder about 
the ways in which a teacher might be able to recognise understanding in their students. 
We came to call such indications the external manifestations of the internal 
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characteristics we had earlier identified, though, again, these came to have a very 
different position as our work developed. 
We identified a number of these manifestations and discovered more in the literature 
(notably Nickerson, 1985) which both extended our own discoveries and gave us a 
sense of being on a fruitful path. Amongst these external manifestations we included: 
• Being able to explain 
• Being able to recognise in other contexts 
• Being able to derive consequences 
We also developed a rough scale on which we could place these manifestations based 
on the reliability with which a teacher could use them to ascertain a learner’s 
understanding. We felt that seeing a pupil do something (such as correctly perform a 
subtraction) was a low level indication of the pupil’s understanding, since the teacher 
has no direct way of knowing whether the pupil has an understanding of what they 
have done rather than reproducing an algorithm from memory. On the other hand, the 
ability to derive consequences (which we had adopted from Nickerson) seemed to be 
less likely to have come from reproduction. 
This work, we felt, had put us in a position to write something which we felt may 
have been of interest to others. We now had both a theoretical perspective on 
understanding and a layer of practical consequences for the teacher. However, all our 
efforts to write this at the time were in vain. While some of this failure may have been 
due to other circumstances, we feel that it may have been some deep-rooted doubt in 
what we had done that prevented us writing.  
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Our recognition of this difficulty led us to try a tactic to get us back on track. We 
decided to return to the literature for inspiration. We decided to re-read Sierpinska 
(1990), which turned our understanding of understanding upside down! 
A BREAKTHROUGH 
In reading Sierpinska’s paper initially we had been puzzled by her question “is 
understanding an act, an emotional experience, an intellectual process or a way of 
knowing?” In our existing definition we saw understanding as a state and became 
puzzled when Sierpinska rejected this and worked with the notion of understanding as 
an act. Re-reading this paper did not clarify our confusion, but led us to look for 
clarification in her more substantial book on the subject (Sierpinska, 1994).  
At the same time we had also begun to realise that there was a problem with our 
existing definition: there seemed to be a hole between the notion of internal 
characteristics and external manifestations. From our current perspective, we can see 
this hole being caused by the tension between seeing internal characteristics as static 
(feeling comfortable etc.) and external manifestations as dynamic (explaining, 
deriving consequences etc.) while for us, understanding was the state of ‘awareness of 
connections between internal mental structures’. The realisation of this difficulty and 
the search for clarification of Sierpinska’s meaning of an ‘act of understanding’ left us 
ripe for a breakthrough.  
The breakthrough began when we realised that we could find a meaning within our 
theoretical framework which could describe an act of understanding and, moreover, 
such a meaning might have a vital role in dissipating the tension between the internal 
and external (albeit with a complete change of meanings as well). We interpreted an 
act of understanding as the use of understanding to solve a problem1. It suddenly 
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became clear to us that it is only through interpreting the physical manifestations of a 
learner’s use of their understanding that the teacher can make any kind of judgement 
about the learner’s existing understanding. 
While it has since become redundant for us, this notion led us to develop an analogy 
which took us a stage further in our thinking. We saw an analogy between having and 
using understanding and the naïve view of potential and kinetic energy. In imagining 
a ball with potential energy, we note that we cannot directly see that energy. 
However, when the ball is falling, while we still cannot see the energy, we can infer 
from our observation of the ball moving and our theoretical perspective on the 
meaning of energy that the ball both has some kinetic energy and began with some 
potential energy. Similarly, we suggest that when a learner has some understanding 
we have no way of directly seeing it. However, when they enact that understanding, 
while we still cannot directly see it, we can begin to infer from our observations of the 
physical actions the learner performs, and our theoretical perspective on the meaning 
of understanding, something about the form of understanding the learner previously 
had2. 
The analogy, partial as it is, led us to think about the question of how the ball gets the 
energy by being lifted off the ground: that is, what might we now mean by ‘building 
understanding’. Thus, we came to a three component definition of understanding. 
THREE COMPONENTS OF UNDERSTANDING 
We named the three components of understanding building, having and enacting. By 
the first of these we mean the formation of the connections between internal mental 
structures that we conjecture constitute the understanding which an individual has 
ready to be used to solve problems. With this meaning, it becomes clear that the 
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mechanisms for the formation (and destruction) of these connections are already 
encapsulated within our theory of responses to natural, conflicting and alien 
experiences. 
The second component, which we term having, is the state of connections at any 
particular time. As teachers, it is this totality of connections (each having the potential 
to be used by the learner) that we are most interested in when we talk about a 
learner’s understanding. It is important, at this point, to recognise that the emphasis on 
‘connections’ gives the theory a different way of addressing the issue of whether 
understanding is ‘all or nothing’. Byers (1980) states both that “teachers often speak 
of understanding in absolute, ‘yes-or-no’ terms” and that Poincaré uses understanding 
in an ‘all or nothing’ sense. In contrast, a number of authors (such as Skemp) develop 
theories which imply a continuum of understanding, some list different kinds of 
understanding (such as the tetrahedral model Byers and Herscovics, 1977) while 
others use the notion of discrete levels (such as Van Hiele, 1986). Our foundation in 
the notion of connections, however, allows us to adopt Nickerson’s ‘depth and 
breadth’ idea 
One way to think of complexity is in terms of the breadth and depth of a 
concept’s connectedness. That is, a concept might be immediately connected 
to many other concepts (which reflects its breadth of connections) and deeply 
connected to some of them, in the sense that the concepts to which it is 
connected are themselves complex and thus connected to many others in 
turn. 
(Nickerson, 1985, p231) 
This notion has an influence on our third component, enacting understanding. By this 
we mean the use of the connections available in the moment to solve a problem or 
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construct a response to a question3. The breadth of understanding which a learner has 
may be evidenced by the number of different possible starting points they have for 
solving a problem, while the depth of their understanding may be evidenced by the 
ways in which they can unpack each stage in their solution in ever more detail, with 
reference to more concepts. As we shall see, it is this third component that has most to 
offer us in terms of enabling a teacher to model a learner’s understanding. 
Note that these three components bring us back to our problem with Sierpinska’s 
question about whether understanding is an act, a state or a process. Our definition 
suggests that there are aspects of all three: an ongoing process of the development of 
connections (building), a state of the available connections at a given time (having) 
and the act of using the connections in response to a problem (enacting). 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE THREE COMPONENTS 
Much of the development for our original definition of understanding came in 
deciding what internal characteristics and external manifestations could be discerned 
when someone had some understanding. In doing this we developed two questions 
which we asked of ourselves and of colleagues. These two questions can be modified 
to determine what we mean by the internal and external aspects of our new definition.  
We can try to determine internal characteristics by asking ourselves and other learners 
the questions: 
what do I feel when I { am building }  my understanding? have am enacting 
and we can try to determine the external manifestations by asking ourselves and other 
teachers the questions 
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what do I expect to be able to see in my students when I believe that 
they { are building }  their understanding? have are enacting 
 
The responses to these questions have led us to build a matrix of these possibilities 
(table 1). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
This table has a number of important points which distinguish our current position 
from our previous development of the definition. Most notably, all the characteristics 
we had before (whether they were internal or external) we now see as internal, though 
they may be associated with different components of understanding.  
It is important to note that, while we have separated out the components of 
understanding, we are not suggesting that they are discrete elements in the learning 
process. We do not suggest that learning is as simple as having a period of building, a 
quiescent state of having and finally a period of activity when understanding is 
enacted. Indeed, in solving a substantial problem a learner may use some recalled 
facts, enact some of their understanding, get stuck, find and resolve conflicts by 
building new connections, enact the understanding inherent in those new connections, 
bring in more recalled ideas and so on. All this may take place in a very short space of 
time during any particular learning incident. 
Inevitably, there are limitation with this matrix and, we believe, some of these 
limitations are inherent in any discussion of the internal workings of a learner. 
Because we have no direct access to the mind of anyone other than our own selves, 
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we have no way of ensuring that any internal characteristics are immutably associated 
with understanding in all people. Through the act of sharing our perceptions of our 
own internal characteristics, we can begin to sense commonalities and, as we have 
already indicated, many of the descriptions here have resonated with the descriptions 
of others or have originated from others and have resonated with us to the extent that 
we have taken them on board as part of the definition and its consequences. 
Similarly, we believe that there are some problems inherent in any discussion of the 
external aspects of understanding. Indeed, the crux of the problem we had with the 
tension between internal and external in our previous definition came, we feel, 
because we permitted too much to be taken as read in the interpretation of the actions 
a learner performs in enacting their understanding. Our current ideas try as much as 
possible to distinguish the act of interpretation from the observation of the physical 
act of the learner and addresses the issue of that interpretation separately. Before we 
do so, however, let us consider each component in turn. 
Internal and External Aspects of Building Understanding 
We have defined building understanding as the formation (or destruction) of 
connections as a result of responding to natural, conflicting and alien experiences. The 
problem of the inaccessibility of internal characteristics may be particularly acute 
with this component. We suggest that it is difficult for a learner to be simultaneously 
focussed on responding to the experiences they are having and on the mental 
reorganisations which that response engenders. The ability to do this is related to what 
we call the intellectual maturity of the learner and is at the heart of the discipline of 
noticing that Mason (1994) has developed. 
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What is accessible to the teacher, as a manifestation of the internal reorganisations 
which may be going on, are the reflex reactions to some of the responses to the 
experiences. For example, if a learner sees a conflict in which two previously 
dissociated structures are brought to bear and which leads them the see, through the 
new connection, a new way of solving the problem, the teacher may see the learner’s 
eyes light up or some other physical manifestation associated with the ‘aha’ moment 
(described so vividly by Gardner, 1982).  
Internal and External Aspects of Having Understanding 
In a passive state, in which the learner is not having to reorganise their internal mental 
structures, or solve the problems put before them by enacting their understanding, the 
internal aspects of having understanding may be more accessible. We feel at ease with 
a topic if we feel we have sufficient connections to be able to cope with the kinds of 
situation we expect to encounter, even to the extent of feeling able to forget the details 
of an algorithm (for example), sure that we can reconstruct them later if needed. 
As our earlier analogy with energy suggests, there can be no active external 
manifestations of the component of having understanding alone4. Manifestations can 
only come when the learner is doing something and, if separated out, the having of 
understanding is a passive state. This has very important implications for a teacher 
trying to model a learner’s understanding: while it is the totality of what the learner 
might be able to do when they use all their available connections which we as 
teachers wish to determine when we consider a learner’s understanding, it is only 
through our interpretations of their actions that we can come to this model. We cannot 
directly access the having component of understanding. 
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Internal and External Aspects of Enacting Understanding 
We defined enacting understanding as the use of available connections in trying to 
solve a problem or respond to a question. This definition suggests a number of 
possible internal characteristics. A learner may be conscious of using connections to 
explain something to someone else, see an aspect of a concept in a context they have 
not used it in before or derive some new consequence of the concept. 
Most important for our discussion of the teacher’s ability to model understanding is 
the external manifestations of these characteristics. We suggest that these internal 
characteristics manifest themselves in a number of physical ways – speaking, writing, 
drawing etc. – which we have put under the heading of ‘doing’. It is interesting to 
note that, while we initially rejected the notion of understanding as being associated 
with doing, it now forms what we feel is a central part of our model of how people 
understand. However, by doing, we do not mean just the completion of routine tasks, 
but any action that may have resulted from using understanding which then becomes 
available to be interpreted by the teacher in their attempt to model the learner’s 
understanding. It is also important to note that the enacting of understanding will not 
necessarily lead to an external manifestation – a learner may solve a problem in their 
head, without recourse to any external representation of that solution or solving act. 
Just because a learner does not appear to be doing anything, it does not mean they 
aren’t enacting their understanding, it just means that, as teachers we have no extra 
information we can use to model the understanding of the learner. 
MODELLING UNDERSTANDING 
We suggest that one of the major roles for a teacher is developing a model of the 
understanding a learner has which will allow them to set tasks and provide contexts to 
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enable the learner to increase the depth and breadth of their understanding, create new 
understandings and become fluent in their use of existing understandings. However, 
this role is an exceedingly complex one because the teacher can work only from their 
interpretation of their observation of the pupils’ actions.  In discussing the difficulty 
of interpretation, we may try to list the aspects of the teacher pupil interaction that can 
affect that interpretation. In doing so, we developed what was to us a useful, if 
complex picture (figure 1) 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In this the teacher has the role of setting tasks for the learner on the basis of their 
current model of that learner’s understanding and on the teacher’s own understanding 
of mathematics. The learner uses their expectations of the teacher (built up in the 
same way that the teacher has built up a model of the learner’s understanding) –
filtered through their theory of what teaching is meant to be – to decide how to react 
to the task. They then react with their understanding of mathematics in the ways we 
shall discuss below. The teacher then interprets the actions they observe, through the 
filter of their theory of learning, to modify their model of the learner’s understanding. 
Such a model is a vast simplification of the interaction process and misses out many 
of its important features (and does not even begin to address learner-learner 
interaction), but it highlights the complexity of just the interaction facet of the issue of 
modelling learners’ understanding through interpretation of their actions. 
Even this simple model highlights two major problems: not all actions come from the 
enactment of understanding and, even if a teacher can be reasonably sure that the 
action is the result of enacting understanding, an enactment represents a single usea of 
a single pathway (whilst the teacher wishes to model the totality of potential 
pathways). 
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The first of these problems has its foundation for us in one of our earliest ideas: the 
contrast between reproduction and reconstruction. In our two incidents described 
earlier, the first seems to show a learner who is attempting to reproduce an algorithm 
and, while she shows a sensible interpretation of the meaning of place value, without 
realising that the algorithm has different meanings for the two ‘1’s in ‘put 1 here, put 
1 there’, she is unable to solve the problem and does not appear to be able to 
reconstruct it by enacting her understanding5. The second incident seems to show a 
learner who could not reproduce a solution, but instead needed to use his connections 
between some trigonometrical concepts to reconstruct the formulae he wanted. For 
our consideration of the ways in which a teacher can model understanding, however, 
we could consider hypothetical incidents in which the first learner does correctly 
recall and apply the equal additions algorithm and in which the second learner can 
recall, without reconstructing, the multiple angle formulae. If we had seen both of 
these hypothetical incidents, we would have seen actions that resulted from 
reproduction and, we suggest, we would have no substantial information with which 
to improve our models of those learner’s understandings. 
Indeed, a learner will reproduce a response if they can do so, even if they are quite 
capable of reconstructing by enacting their understanding. Bartlett (1932) suggests 
that there is considerably more mental effort involved in reconstruction than in recall. 
Thus in modelling understanding, a teacher may be misled into thinking that a 
solution to a problem is one obtained by enacting understanding but which could, 
instead, have been reproduced from memory. Indeed, if we note the analogies 
between our theory of understanding and the connectionist approach to artificial 
neural networks we may wonder about results, detailed in Patterson (1996), in which 
neural networks can become so specialised to specific tasks that the pathways become 
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over-trained. This analogy suggests that when a learner is easily able to reproduce, a 
question which asks them to reconstruct (such as a request to explain) may be very 
difficult to cope with and the shift of attention from the performance of the procedure 
to the reconstruction of an explanation may be hard to do. 
We might naïvely assume that at least we could conclude something from a learner’s 
failure to solve a problem. But even here there are difficulties: when a learner fails to 
reproduce a solution, they may try to enact their understanding to construct one, but 
while they could have the understanding needed, they may not have the awareness of 
the connections they need at that moment to respond to that situation. A failure to 
enact may not be a sign of a lack of having understanding. 
The second problem – that even if the pupil is enacting their understanding, it may 
well be the result of the use of only a small portion of the understanding they have – is 
a signal that we have an even more complex issue. Modelling understanding is a long 
term process in which the teacher repeatedly revises the model every time they 
interpret an action as one which has come from enacting understanding. 
THE FIRST CONSEQUENCES FOR TEACHING 
Despite these two layers of complexity, we suggest that this new definition of 
understanding leads to some practical suggestions for a teacher trying to model their 
pupils' understanding: 
• Teachers need to be aware that modelling is a long term process and they need 
to build a model from interpreting a large number of actions resulting from 
questions or problems  which allow a range of  broader and deeper 
understandings to be enacted 
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• To try to avoid the problem of reproduction as much as possible, teachers 
might use questions which make reproduction easier to spot: requests to 
explain, setting questions in new contexts etc. may all help do this. 
• To try to avoid situations in which understanding cannot be enacted because of 
a lack of awareness of the connections that are available, questions might be 
put in many different ways and at many different times. 
These are the beginnings of the implications for our new definition of understanding 
within our developing theory of learning. It is important to realise that our theory 
develops by moving between the theoretical search for implications, the discovery of 
practical consequences for ourselves and others and the application to incidents from 
our own teaching and learning. As such, the theory of learning progresses as a 
journey, with the definition of understanding being yet another step. 
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Footnotes: 
 
1 It is important to note that the breakthrough came from misreading Sierpinska: we 
do not now believe that she uses ‘act of understanding’ in this sense, but that for her it 
is the overcoming of an epistemological obstacle. This alternative meaning has come 
to form part of our definition in what we later describe as ‘building understanding’ 
 
2 The energy analogy recalls the horrors detailed by Feynman (1985) in the 
nonsensical ways in which textbooks use the word ‘energy’. Feynman describes a 
textbook in which students are asked what makes a wind-up toy go, what makes an 
automobile go etc. and was horrified to find the answer ‘energy makes it go’ to each 
question 
“Now that doesn’t mean anything. Suppose it’s “Wakalixes.” That’s the 
general principle: “Wakalixes makes it go.” There’s no knowledge coming in 
… it’s just a word” 
Similarly, understanding is too often just another ‘Wakalixes” word. 
 
3 We do not, by the use of ‘enacting’, mean to imply any connection between this part 
of our definition and the theory of ‘enactivism’ espoused by Varela et al (1991). 
 
4 In a classroom context, it may be that the demeanour of a learner can indicate 
something about their confidence in the subject matter, but we suggest that this may 
not necessarily manifest itself through some action. 
 
5 That is not to say that the student had no understanding of subtraction – her words ‘I 
wish she’d let us do it in our heads’ at least seems to imply that she has a method (and 
perhaps an understanding) for solving the problem. 
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Table: 
 
 
component of 
understanding 
 
building 
 
having 
 
enacting 
 
internal 
characteristics 
 
noticing? 
 
feeling 
comfortable 
feeling able to 
forget (and 
reconstruct later) 
solving problems 
explaining to 
others 
using in a new 
context 
deriving 
consequences 
external 
manifestation 
‘eyes lighting up’ 
‘Aha’ 
none Doing 
 Table 1  
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